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 The challenge of fulﬁlling
aspirations
This year’s election is a watershed in Indian history. This
editorial discusses possible reasons for the stunning defeat of
the previous government. While there is no denying that the
previous government could be faulted for many things including
creating a leadership vacuum and letting corruption go
unchecked, the knockout blow came from its inability to reform
the institutions that are responsible for fulfilling legitimate
aspirations of the masses. What should the central government
do? 
The recent parliamentary election may turn out to be a
watershed moment in Indian history. The previous government
has lost by a margin that exceeded even the most optimistic
expectations of its critics. Congress, for so long at the helm of
affairs, has been decimated to the extent that its revival is in
serious doubt.
What caused this deluge?
Sources of disenchantment  
Of course, the sense of disenchantment has been palpable for a
while, and one could easily point at many possible sources of it:
slowdown in growth rates over the past three years, a non-
communicative Prime Minister indicating a leadership vacuum,
and to top it all – corruption scandals. This general sense of
malaise and disenchantment created an open terrain for pundits
to trot out their own pet theories. For example, that the
Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government
killed growth by creating disincentives for investment – both
domestic and multinational. Or, through a programme of
redistribution, they snuffed out individual initiative and also
created unsustainable fiscal deficits. In addition to all this, the
government could not hold inflation, especially food price
inflation, at bay.
But is this what an average voter cares about? All those who
turned against the previous government were not the readers of
Business pages who worried about the investment climate or the
deficits. They felt let down. Why?
Which of the above mentioned conjectures are supported by
evidence?
First, note that investment as a percentage of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) – Gross Capital Formation (GCF) –
rose significantly during the UPA regime.
Figure 1. Gross Capital Formation, 1991-2012
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Figure 1. Gross Capital Formation, 1991-2012
And, so did Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) except for the
crisis years of 2007-2008 and the slowdown years of 2011-
2013.
Figure 2. FDI inflows, 2000-2013
Were the voters spooked by the specter of macroeconomic
profligacy? It does not seem so if we take a look at what
happened to fiscal deficit and public debt.  Except for the years
of financial crisis (2007-2008) when the government had to
borrow for the purpose of giving a much-needed stimulus, the
fiscal deficit has not been out of control.
Figure 3a. Fiscal Deficit, 1994-2013
Source: Ghatak, Ghosh and Kotwal (2014); based on RBI data
Figure 3b. Public Debt
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Source: Ghatak, Ghosh and Kotwal (2014); based on World
Bank data.
Most importantly, as Figures 4 and 5 below indicate, for 7 out
of 10 years, the average growth rate of GDP has been higher
than ever before (for a comparable span of time) and it
compares favourably with that of the rest of the world during
the same period. When the financial crisis hit the US and
Europe in 2007-08, the growth in India slowed down but made
a quick recovery. During the last three years, the growth in the
whole world slowed down but admittedly Indian growth slid
down more precipitously.
Figure 4. Annual growth rates, 1991-2012
Source: RBI
Figure 5. Annual growth rates of India vis-à-vis China and the
world, 1998-2013 
Thus, the claims that the electoral disaster for the previous
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Thus, the claims that the electoral disaster for the previous
government was brought about by a weak growth performance
induced by low rates of investment and fiscal profligacy are
thus not supported by the evidence on the actual outcomes of
the economy. The exception is the last three years during which
the growth rate fell as it did in the world as a whole. And the
growth slowdown surely played a role especially because the
media targeted it as a clear manifestation of the failure of the
government’s economic policy.
In any case, a slowdown of the growth rate can only affect the
electoral behaviour of an average voter provided he or she is
directly affected by it. Given that a vast majority of Indian
voters are under twice the poverty line, their preferences would
depend to a significant level by what happened to the head
count ratio. However, poverty was declining somewhat faster
during the UPA regimes than what they had experienced in the
past (See Figure 6 below). In fact, during the years of
precipitous growth decline (2010-2012), poverty decline was
the fastest due to the enormous rise in demand for unskilled
workers in the construction sector despite the growth
slowdown.
Figure 6. Consumption expenditure
Note that ‘Z’ and ‘2Z’ indicate the poverty line and twice the
poverty line and their intersection with the cumulative
distribution lines corresponding to the successive NSS years give
the percentage of the population under the two poverty lines
respectively.
However, I believe that the growth slowdown rankled the
urban elite much more than the masses that voted against the
previous government. Most voters react to their own
perceptions of how the government policies are affecting their
lives and not to the numbers that appear in the business pages
of newspapers. As mentioned before, the growth slowdown
during the last three years did not slowdown the decline in the
poverty numbers and a majority of voters are poor.
What then explains the electoral rout?
Inflation certainly has a valid claim. Yet, note that real incomes
were growing during this period and poverty numbers based on
(real consumption expenditure) were coming down.
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(real consumption expenditure) were coming down.
Figure 7. Annual Inflation rate for Industrial Workers (IW),
1997-2013
Source: Ghatak, Ghosh and Kotwal (2014); based on RBI data
Dysfunctional institutions as long-run poverty traps 
Note that growth is invariably accompanied by a decline in the
percentage of population under the poverty line. However, this
does not necessarily translate into a developmental
transformation whereby the next generation gets catapulted
onto a more productive activity, and therefore into a more
secure and better life than their parents’. That can only happen
if the public institutions that enable such transformation
function effectively.
During a period of sustained growth, as over the last twenty
years in India, people become hopeful. Families that for
generations had remained in low-productivity activities start
dreaming of brighter futures for their children. This is especially
so when people belonging to the same class are getting breaks
and climbing out of poverty, “Why can’t my kids get a salaried
job in the city when his could?” But if the growth in
opportunities is not keeping pace with a visible rise in the
consumption levels all around you, such dreams are shattered
and resentment grows. The anger born out of frustration gets
directed towards the government in power and the anger is
intensified when corruption scandals break out one after
another.
I believe that this is one of the main reasons for the electoral
rout of the last government. The generation that had
experienced stagnant incomes had begun to hope that at last the
country was on the move and their children would get
education and secure salaried jobs. They could witness some
people reaping such opportunities. But the hopes of many were
frustrated, as the public system of education remained
dysfunctional. Public healthcare fared even worse.  Their hard
earned money had to be spent on private schools and tuitions
and private healthcare. The window of opportunity was open
for just a fraction of the aspirants.
It was not as if the UPA government was totally unaware of the
simmering resentment. There was a spate of well-intended
legislation aimed at the poor.  But partly due to bad design and
partly due to poor implementation, the attempt to woo the poor
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partly due to poor implementation, the attempt to woo the poor
flopped. In fact, it may have made matters worse by promising
much but delivering little. Right to Education did little to
improve the quality of public education. The Public
Distribution System (PDS), through which the Food Security
Act is supposed to be implemented, is leaky and corrupt, and so
is the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act (MNREGA). Public Health Clinics are dysfunctional
beyond belief. Panchayats have proved to be ineffectual in
creating local infrastructure that could have enabled the poor to
realise their aspirations.
Thus, though the poverty declined in absolute terms, the
institutions that could have enabled the poor to climb out of
poverty permanently have been ineffective. When a part of the
population was experiencing massive increases in their standard
of living, a majority of Indians was left to contemplate the
prospect of never being able to transform their lives and to
climb out of poverty permanently. The main reason for this
long-run poverty trap was government failure to improve the
institutions that spur development.
How exactly do institutions impinge on the process of
development?
Though India now has the status of an emerging economy, 90%
of its labour force still toils in the informal sector that is
characterised by low level of technology and skills, and
therefore, low level of productivity. It is evident that the high
rates of growth achieved by India have been mostly due to the
formal sector growth that in turn was based on technology
transfer from developed countries.
The process of development proceeds along two channels: (1)
by improving the productivity of the informal sector, and (2) by
transferring labour from the informal to the formal sector of the
economy. Neither of the two channels can work well without
properly functioning institutions. Why so?
Note that productivity is low in the informal sector because it
does not have access to good infrastructure (example, good
roads, power, credit and information) as well as to skills. Such
access is very much based on institutions of local governance
such as panchayats. Similarly, the movement of labour from the
informal to the formal sector depends on the skill level of
workers. Without a minimum skill level, they could not be
employed with a high level of technology, and it is the
educational system that transforms unskilled labour into skilled
labour. That system is clearly failing in its mission, judging
from the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) that
evaluates the quality of education across the country. The ASER
data (Figures 8a and 8b below) shows that the quality of
education, measured by the simple metrics of (i) the percentage
of children in higher classes who can read a standard II text,
and (ii) the percentage of children who can do simple division in
classes 4th through 8th, has deteriorated. The demographic
dividend that India is supposed to enjoy will amount to nothing
given the state of Indian education.
Figure 8a. Quality of school education (2009, 2011 and 2013)
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Source: ASER
Figure 8b. Quality of school education (2009, 2011 and 2013)
Source: ASER 
Improving the system of public education, however, is an uphill
task. Education, first of all, is a state subject; the central
government can pass laws but the implementation will always
be in the hands of the states. This is why we see so much
variation in the quality of education across states. It is the
responsibility of panchayats to build schools and to hold
teachers accountable. If the local governance at the Panchayat
level is not satisfactory, the problem will remain unsolved.
What is true of education is equally true of public healthcare,
local infrastructure and other things that have the potential of
enabling the poor to escape out of the poverty trap for good.
What is needed is an improvement in the institutional
performance at all levels and that is more easily said than done.
Difficulties in improving the institutional performance
What we mean by institutional performance is nothing other
than the behaviour of the officials and workers associated with
the particular institution. For example, schools and clinics will
not function well if teachers and health workers do not show up
very often or do not work diligently. It depends partly on the
incentives built into the design of the institution (if such
behaviour is monitored and used in the determination of their
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behaviour is monitored and used in the determination of their
incomes), and partly on the social norms prevalent in the
culture (whether there is a stigma attached to irresponsible
behaviour). These social norms in turn are shaped by the
history and geography of the place. Thus, a significant
determinant of institutional performance lies outside any quick
policy fix today. Social norms can change in response to a
change in the incentive structure but it takes time. This is what
makes improving institutional performance a big challenge.
Often, even well-designed institutions perform badly. The 73rd
amendment in 1992 was intended to devolve power down to
local levels to make the allocation of government resources
more aligned with local preferences, and the government more
accountable to the people it serves. Officials at all three levels of
the Panchayat are elected through a democratic process. One
can hardly find fault with the design of this set of institutions.
Even elections take place as ordained and the voter turnout is
impressive.
By design and in operation, these institutions – vital for
development – should serve the interests of the majority. But in
many states, they do not, and the reason is that despite the
democratic design, the local elite can easily manipulate these
institutions to their own advantage. Even centrally allocated
funds do not get used for their intended purpose. The demand
for MNREGA works gets suppressed. Public goods that would
benefit the poor do not get built, if any of this would increase
the wages of the local labour at the expense of the local elites
(Anderson, Francois and Kotwal 2014).
The local elites are in a position to do so because the local
population is still dependent on them for warding off
consumption contingencies when other channels such as access
to formal credit are conspicuous by its absence. As long as
people are living at subsistence with a contingency such as bad
weather or a family illness lurking around the corner, this
dependence will continue. If the incomes increase sufficiently so
that people can depend on their own savings, the dependence
will go down. Similarly, if the development process creates
alternate sources of credit, the dependence will go down. The
catch-22 here is that, partly, the process of development that
would break the stranglehold of the elite is itself under their
control.
Improving the institutional performance, therefore, means
unveiling reforms that would change the ethos of the whole
country. This is no easy task.
But does this mean that the central government can do nothing?
Modi has fought and won the election with the slogan of ‘Good
Governance’. It is a short form for ‘improvement in institutional
performance’. I have argued above that it is a promise hard to
fulfill and yet it is exactly what the electorate wants.  What can
the Modi government do?
The ethical standards observed by local government officials
could hardly be independent of those followed by the higher-
level officials such as cabinet ministers and the upper echelons
of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). A code of conduct
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of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). A code of conduct
for the higher level officials is something the new government
can enforce, and in all likelihood, they are likely to do so.
One reason for local corruption is that the public at large
knows little about the funds that the local governments have at
their disposal and their intended use. The monopoly of
information confers a great deal of power on those who have it.
 The central government can reduce this power by posting (and
pushing the state governments to post) the relevant information
online. If villagers are unable to access it, Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) could do it on their behalf. Right to
Information Act enacted by the previous government is helpful
in this regard.
Since local elites are able to use the institutions for their own
benefit by exploiting the dependence of the local population, it
is crucial to reduce this dependence. Technology can be used
judiciously for this purpose. For example, if the wages of
workers participating in MNREGA projects are transferred
directly into their Unique Identity (UID)-linked bank accounts,
the local elite can be bypassed to a large extent. This is
something that was already started by the previous government
and will hopefully continue.
Concluding remarks
To sum up, this year’s election is a watershed in Indian history.
The stunning defeat of the previous government was most likely
a result of the frustration of unprecedentedly high aspirations
created by sustained growth in the previous three decades.
There is no denying that the previous government could be
faulted for many things including creating a leadership vacuum
and letting corruption go unchecked under its watch. I believe
however that the knockout blow came from its inability to
reform the institutions at all levels that are responsible for
preventing legitimate aspirations of the masses from being
realised. Clearly, the mandate of the new government is to
improve institutional performance. This is a highly difficult task
as institutional performance depends on many factors beyond
the control of the central government. However, there are a few
things that the central government can do to fulfill the mandate
given to them by the voters. If they fail, the surge of enthusiasm
for them will turn into a tidal wave of resentment.
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